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Abstract 
Peoples, societies, institutions and other entities frequently record their 
histories in terms of successive epochs, and commemorate those histories 
according to perceived milestones or turning points in their development.  
Since much of human history has been dominated by strife and warfare, 
national and international milestones are frequently embedded in notions of 
a military past.  Milestones in military history may be divided into three 
broad categories, namely those representing significant strides in the 
evolution of warfare, those associated with bravery, heroic sacrifice and 
great loss, and those of decisive political importance.  Defence forces in 
general, and individual military units in particular, are extremely conscious 
of their past and often commemorate milestones through customs, traditions, 
and splendid parades and ceremonial displays.  This year (2012), the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) celebrates its centenary against 
the complex background of South Africa’s long history of internal strife 
interspaced with participation in foreign conflicts.  This article reflects on 
the commemoration of South Africa’s military history within the context of 
the divergent historical heritages of the SANDF and its predecessors.  It 
commences with a brief background on memory, identity and the 
commemoration of history and military history.  Thereafter it outlines the 
commemoration of a few of the foremost milestones in South African 
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military history associated with the evolution of warfare, with bravery, 
heroic sacrifice and great loss, and with political change within its historical 
and current context. 
Keywords: South African National Defence Force, centenary, 
commemoration, milestones, military history 
Introduction 
Peoples, societies, institutions and other entities more often than not record 
their histories in terms of successive epochs and commemorate those 
histories according to perceived milestones or turning points that marked the 
ebb and flow of their progression over time.  Historical commemorations are 
usually associated with triumph and progression, but some, such as the 
NAAF Project,1 an online memorial to the Holocaust, serve as stark 
warnings against past mistakes, injustices and atrocities.  Militaries are 
particularly conscious of their past, which they commemorate through 
customs, traditions and splendid parades and ceremonial displays to 
celebrate their achievements on the battlefield, foster esprit de corps or 
demonstrate their preparedness to protect national security.  Robert Leckie 
even suggests, albeit speculatively, that the idea of commemoration and the 
very origins of civilisation could be traced back to the military when he 
writes –  
it might very well have been that the warrior’s desire to perpetuate the glory of 
his deeds in song and story was the original impetus for written language, the 
arrival of which is usually considered the beginning of civilized society.2 
Milestones in military history are associated mostly with particular 
wars and battles, victories over significant enemies, or with famous 
commanders.  The commemoration and celebration of such milestones are 
normally not intended as a glorification of war, but as a tribute to the genius, 
courage, sacrifices and achievements of soldiers and societies.  The 
commemoration of military milestones may take many forms in addition to 
customs, traditions, parades and ceremonies as mentioned above.  This 
includes national holidays, public lectures and speeches, publications, songs, 
poems, statues, memorials, monuments, museums, conferences, and the 
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naming of medals, decorations, buildings, streets, suburbs, towns, 
municipalities, and institutions, to mention but a few.  
Broadly speaking, milestones in military history may be divided into 
three categories, namely events representing significant strides in the 
evolution of warfare, events associated with bravery, heroic sacrifice and 
great loss, and events of decisive political importance.  In terms of the 
evolution of warfare, the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, for example, marked 
the dawn of mechanised warfare.  The “last charge of the British Light 
Brigade” during the Battle of Balaklava in 1854 is an example of mindless 
slaughter through perceived tactical folly in the face of technological 
advances, while the Battle of Waterloo, ending 23 years of French 
revolutionary wars (1792–1815) was an important political milestone in the 
history of Europe.  It is obviously impossible, however, to place milestones 
in military history into watertight compartments, because the same event is 
often significant from more than one perspective.  The Battle of Waterloo, 
for instance, also marks the end of French tactical superiority on the 
battlefield. 
This year (2012), the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
celebrates its centenary against the complex background of South Africa’s 
long history of internal strife interspaced with participation in conflicts 
abroad.  The aim of this article is to reflect on the commemoration of South 
Africa’s military history within the context of the SANDF centenary and the 
divergent historical heritages of its predecessors.  It commences with a brief 
background on memory, identity and the commemoration of history and 
military history.  Thereafter it outlines the commemoration of a few of the 
foremost milestones in South African military history associated with the 
evolution of warfare, with bravery, heroic sacrifice and great loss, and with 
political change within their historical and current context. 
Identity, Commemoration and the Rewriting of History 
Milestones associated with the evolution of warfare are comparatively free 
of emotion and are consequently often not commemorated beyond Military 
History classrooms and college staff rides.  Some of them, such as the 
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are obviously 
extremely loaded,3 emotionally and politically.  Milestones associated with 
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bravery, heroic sacrifice and great loss, and those of decisive political 
importance often stir up much emotion and are usually celebrated with 
solemn ceremonies or brilliant displays.  Military milestones of perceived 
decisive political significance invariably evoke the most emotion and often 
lead to an upsurge of nationalism, sometimes even triumphant outbursts of 
the latter. In heterogeneous societies with a divided past, especially in the 
wake of recent constitutional unification where nation-building is still in its 
infancy, such episodes might revive old conflicts and create socio-political 
instability.  This may be ascribed to the fact that the commemoration of 
history is a function of memory, myth and identity.  Human experience and 
perceptions about the past create memory and myths, and construct identity, 
which, in turn, informs the production of history4 and the identification of 
historical milestones to serve as a basis for the commemoration of history. 
Brown asserts that modern ideas about memory are rooted in classical 
philosophy, where “remembering is seen as inseparable from questions of 
moral judgement” and “remembrance is the drawing together of the past in 
the present for purposes of evaluation and making choices”.5  “The past”, he 
continues, “is rarely neutral … it comes with implications about present 
circumstances and future courses of action.  These may appear in the form 
of continuities or breaks, succession or branching.”6  In a similar vein, H.E. 
Stolten observes, “History writing is an important part of a nation state’s 
collective memory and history is not simply a product of the past, but often 
an answer to demands of the present.”7  The demands of the present often 
lead to the exploitation of history for “ideological mobilisation”.8  
Pennebaker and Banasik also stress that “history … is highly contextual” 
and they continue, 
social psychological processes help to define history.  The ways 
people talk and think about recent and distant events is determined by 
current needs and desires …  Just as the key to the future is the past, 
the key to the past is the present.9 
These notions, as Michael Radu observes,10 bring to mind George Orwell’s 
famous “Party slogan”: “Who controls the past, controls the future; who 
controls the present controls the past.”11 
Radu holds that politicians have appreciated the truth of Orwell’s 
pronouncement for a long time12 and contends that “the war of ideas 
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[consequently] begins with national memory”.13  National memory, and 
hence national identity, is by and large constructed by rewriting history – a 
task undertaken by politicians, activists, journalists and historians, lay and 
professional.  According to Radu, the goal of rewriting history “is always 
the same: to legitimize present ideas or rulers in the past … the instruments 
favoured are propaganda, education in most cases, and legislation in some 
cases’.14  In this process, grey areas in history are systematically eliminated 
and interpretations polarised and contemporary norms and values 
anachronistically applied to times, peoples and places where those norms 
and values have little if any validity.15  Rewriting history in service of 
politics changes the context of historical events, inter alia by redefining 
milestones.  Reconstructed histories thus award new or alternative 
significance to historic events and create new heroes and new victories to 
suit new identities.16 
The Dominance of War in Human Society and the Commemoration of 
History 
Former Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in Kabul, Lt. Gen. 
David J. Richards, observes, “it is a sad reflection but a truism that the 
history and fluctuating fortunes of nations can be tracked through military 
events.  Nations and nation-states are formed and shaped through adversity, 
as are international relationships”.17  This obviously echoes Von 
Clausewitz’s idea that war is the continuation of politics by other means, 
and Robert Leckie’s view that war rather than peace has historically been 
the normal state in human society.18  Since so much of human history has 
indeed been dominated by strife and warfare, milestones – national and 
international – are often embedded in military history.  This is particularly 
true of South Africa, a country, sadly, with a rich military history.  Joseph 
Lehmann writes: 
To the Victorians South Africa was a land of surprises, a land of extremes 
where unparalleled discoveries in diamonds and gold coincided with incredible 
political and military blunders.  It was a land of warfare, endemic ever since 
Cape Town was surrendered to the British in 1806.  While the sun never set on 
the British Empire, the blood never seemed to dry in South Africa.  Britons, 
Boers and blacks clashed and fought and fought again, in a fashion bewildering 
to those in distant centres of world civilisation.19 
18 
 
 
South African military history is obviously much older than British 
colonialism and, regretfully, continued beyond its demise.  Ian van der 
Waag states,  
South Africa’s past is written in the blood of her people.  From the earliest 
conflicts between the San and Khoikhoi through to the dawn of the “New 
South Africa”, South Africa’s past is the story of conflict among her people; in 
an untold number of wars, battles, skirmishes and actions.20   
Since the early inhabitants of the territory lacked a written tradition 
and very little oral military history has survived, milestones in pre-colonial 
South African military history are essentially linked to European 
incursion.21  The fact that much of South Africa’s colonial and post-colonial 
military history concerns internal conflict and has predominantly been 
recorded from a perceived “non-indigenous” (or “non-first-nation”) 
perspective, makes it particularly susceptible to diverging interpretations, 
claims and vigorous dispute.  The SANDF was born within this diverging 
historical discourse on 27 April 1994, as it was created through the 
integration of the statutory defence forces of the RSA (SADF) and the 
formerly so-called independent black homelands (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), and the non-statutory forces of the 
African National Congress (MK), the Pan Africanist Congress (APLA) and 
the KwaZulu-Natal Self Protection Force. 
The SANDF as such is just eighteen years old, but by claiming 1912, 
the establishment date of its oldest statutory predecessor, the Union Defence 
Forces (subsequently the South African Defence Force (SADF), as its actual 
date of birth, the SANDF celebrates its one-hundredth birthday this year.  
That date can also, albeit indirectly, be linked to the birth of the ANC’s 
military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), although the latter was only 
founded in 1961, since 1912 was also the year in which the ANC itself was 
established.  The history of the SANDF goes by extension, however, 
infinitely further back than a hundred years through the historical legacies 
imbedded in its identity by the integration of the various statutory and non-
statutory militaries.  South Africa’s pre-1912 military history influenced or 
informed the historical memory, heritage, identity and traditions of the 
former SADF and is still influencing those facets of the SANDF, but from a 
different perspective.  This is evident, inter alia, in the naming and renaming 
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of military buildings and training facilities, as well as ships, medals and 
decorations.  Hence pre-1994 milestones in military history are still relevant 
to the SANDF today. 
South African Milestones in the Evolution of Warfare 
Indigenous warfare developed in South Africa, at least in terms of weapons, 
in much the same way as elsewhere in the world, although not 
simultaneously with, for example, developments in Europe.  Specific 
milestones in the pre-colonial evolution of warfare in South Africa are not 
easy to identify.  Shaka’s military leadership, reforms and innovations have 
long been celebrated as a milestone in South African and African military 
history.  Yet, Dan Wylie found that most of this is pure myth.  Shaka, he 
maintains, did not invent the famous “ox head” military formation.  It 
already existed before Shaka started using it, and there is no evidence that 
he even used it on more than one occasion.  Shaka also did not invent the 
short stabbing spear for close combat as is widely held.  Shaka most 
probably refined some of these military innovations but he did not initiate 
them.  Moreover, his alleged decisive victory over the Ndwandwe at Gqokli 
Hill, widely praised as his greatest military triumph, according to Wylie, 
never happened.  It is a flight of Ritter’s imagination that found its way into 
history texts from his novel Shaka Zulu.22  The popular image of Shaka as 
military genius and/or brutal, bloodthirsty ruler and conqueror, the 
“cynosure of Zulu nationhood, and the epitome of African brutality”,23 
Wylie asserts, survives because it is “so intriguing, so dramatic, so 
archetypal, and sometimes so politically useful”.24  Though milestones in 
the evolution of warfare are normally devoid of emotions or politics, it is 
thus clearly not always the case, especially where fact and legend meet. 
Since firepower is at the heart of conventional warfare, it is not 
surprising that it was also at the heart of milestones in the evolution of 
warfare in South Africa.  In Voortrekker history, Vegkop (1836), Blood 
River (1838) and similar battles stand out for the fact that concentrated 
firepower from the protection of reinforced wagon laagers offered a solution 
to the numerical superiority of the Voortrekkers’ indigenous enemies.  The 
First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881) produced two noteworthy milestones 
associated with the ever-increasing devastation of modern firepower.  
Military units had carried their flags, banners and regimental colours into 
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battle since ancient times in order to identify individual units and to serve as 
a rallying point amidst the noise and chaos of battle.  Regimental colours 
were frequently destroyed or badly damaged in battle and often captured by 
the enemy.  Worse still, in the words of Lehmann, “the two unfortunate 
subalterns selected to carry the colours … into action were almost certain to 
be downed; and those rushing forward to pick up the ‘soul’ of their unit 
would in all probability suffer a similar fate”.25  Mainly as a result of the 
influence of British military reformer Sir Garnet Wolseley, who held that 
“any general who condemned an officer to death by ordering him to carry a 
standard into battle against high-powered rifles ‘should be tried for 
murder’”,26 the British army abandoned the practice of carrying regimental 
colours into battle.  The last British Regiment to do so was the 58th 
Regiment during the Battle of Laing’s Nek on 28 January 1881.  Since then, 
colours are left safely at home when units go to war.27  The second 
firepower-related milestone in the development of warfare during the First 
Anglo-Boer War also took place during the Battle of Laing’s Nek: the 
British soldiers dyed their white helmets and belts brown with cow-dung 
and coffee grounds to make them less conspicuous targets.  Not smelling too 
good for a few days was much better than inviting Boer fire!28  By the 
Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) the British had done away altogether 
with their brightly coloured uniforms and took to the field in khaki.29 
Firepower also produced two significant milestones in the evolution of 
warfare during the Second Anglo-Boer War.  The Battle of Magersfontein 
(11 December 1899) is often associated with the birth of the type of trench 
warfare that dominated the First World War on the Western Front in the face 
of the enormous firepower of accurate, long-range magazine rifles that had 
made the defensive stronger than the offensive.30  The dominance of the 
defensive over the offensive in turn triggered another milestone, namely a 
closer integration of infantry and artillery tactics.  In the past, the artillery 
bombarded the enemy in preparation of the infantry attack and ceased fire 
when the latter commenced.  This made the infantry advance a suicidal 
exercise in the face of the high volume of fire maintained with the accurate, 
long-range magazine rifles from the safety of trenches and other forms of 
cover.  The solution Lord Buller and his officers found on the Thukela front 
in February 1900 was to keep the head of the enemy down with artillery fire 
during the infantry advance.  This was the birth of the so-called “creeping” 
or “rolling” artillery barrage ahead of the infantry which supported them 
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throughout the battle instead of only softening the enemy before the infantry 
advance.31  The opposing forces perfected the rolling or creeping artillery 
barrage on the Western Front during World War I until, in the words of John 
Terraine, it became “a (moving) curtain of bursting shells … nailing the 
enemy into his deep shelters until the last moment when the attacking 
infantry was virtually on top of him”.32 
The Battle of Magersfontein stands out as an extremely “black day” in 
the history of the British Army, particularly for the Black Watch.  Buller’s 
breakthrough on the Thukela front on Majuba Day 1900, the 
commemoration of the decisive Boer victory of the First Anglo-Boer War, 
was a bitter irony for the Boers and a moral triumph for the British.33  
Purely from the perspective of milestones in the evolution of warfare, 
however, both battles are devoid of politics and emotion. 
Whatever milestones in the evolution of warfare South Africa’s 
Border War produced, such as the claim that the first ever close air support 
to South African ground forces by helicopter gunships at night took place at 
Ongiva during Operation PROTEA in August 1981,34 were equally devoid 
of emotion and politics.  In sharp contrast, the first confirmed killing and 
also the first capture of Russian military personnel by the South African 
forces on the same occasion,35 proving Soviet combat involvement in 
Angola to the Western world, was, of course, of great political significance. 
Milestones of Bravery or Heroic Sacrifice 
Milestones of bravery, heroic sacrifice or great loss of human life in war 
often relate to desperate defence of a cause or position, but may also refer to 
bold offensive action to take a key position against great odds.  Such 
milestones often also contain an element of sudden disaster or mindless 
slaughter, often through superior numbers, superior technology or superior 
(state) power.  A systematic search of South Africa’s long history of ethnic 
and racial strife and violence from pre-colonial times to 1994 would reveal 
many such examples, be it through oral tradition or written record.  Before 
the arrival of the Europeans, conflict occurred between South Africa’s first 
peoples, the San, the Khoikhoi and the Bantu-speaking groups, but very 
little is known about such conflicts, their intensity and casualties.36  Some 
authors are of the opinion that such clashes were not particularly bloody, but 
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there is just not enough knowledge available to come to a firm conclusion.  
Even if fragments of this early South African military history have survived 
through oral tradition, it is not commemorated, except perhaps in tale and 
song in rural communities.  The two rather inconclusive “formal” wars 
fought during the Dutch subjugation of the Khoikhoi (1659–1660 and 1673–
1677) are obviously significant milestones in South Africa’s political 
history, but are arguably not primarily remembered as milestones of 
bravery, heroic sacrifice or great loss of human lives because they were 
comparatively low in intensity and not extremely bloody.  During the first 
Dutch-Khoikhoi War, the Dutch authorities actively tried to limit loss of life 
amongst the Khoikhoi by offering a reward of 40 guilders to expedition 
members for every Khoikhoi captured and only half that amount (20 
guilders) for every one killed. 37 
The Dutch wars against the San, who committed many atrocities 
against the Trekboers in their relentless resistance to the penetration of their 
traditional habitat, were brutal and indeed amounted to mindless slaughter.  
A milestone in this regard was the wide-ranging punitive expedition under 
Commandant Rudolph Opperman sent in 1774 by the Cape government 
against the San on the northern frontier.  Since the San rejected every 
attempt at negotiation, the Cape government sanctioned the merciless 
slaughter of men, women and children alike on the battlefield.  Opperman’s 
commando killed a total of 503 San and captured 241 women and children, 
who were forced into labour.38 
The conflict amongst the European settlers and the Xhosa on the 
Cape’s eastern frontier lasted a hundred years, from 1779 to 1879, and 
erupted in nine bloody frontier wars: two under Dutch rule and the rest 
under British rule.39  Much mindless slaughter took place on both sides 
during and between these nine milestones.  For Xhosa people, King Hintsa 
ka Phalo’s controversial, contested killing and alleged beheading by British 
soldiers during the Sixth Frontier War (1835) still stands out vividly in this 
context.40  In the Voortrekker-Zulu conflict of the early nineteenth century, 
the massacre of Piet Retief and his men at Ungungundlovu, and the Boer 
families along the Bloukrans and Boesmans Rivers by the Zulus and the 
slaughtering of Zulu warriors by the Voortrekkers at Ncome River (Blood 
River)41 are recalled with great sadness by the respective sides.  Amongst 
the more recent of such grim milestones are the mass slaughtering of almost 
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860 British soldiers by Zulu warriors at Isandlwana in 1879,42 the death of 
tens of thousands of South Africans, both black and white, in British 
concentration camps during the Second Anglo-Boer War,43 the annihilation 
of some 750 white South African soldiers at Delville Wood in 1916,44 the 
drowning of over 600 black South Africans during the sinking of the SS 
Mendi in 1917,45 the slaying of black demonstrators at Sharpeville and 
Langa in 1960, and the massacre of black students in Soweto in 1976.46  The 
events at Sharpeville, Langa and Soweto are mentioned here as “military” 
milestones against the background of revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary violence.  However politically loaded the memory of 
these events is, all of them are sad milestones of extreme human sacrifice 
and as such at least to some degree respected across political and ideological 
divides today. 
Military-Political Milestones 
Since the early inhabitants of the territory that forms the Republic of South 
Africa today lacked a written tradition and very little oral history has 
survived, milestones in pre-colonial South African military history are 
essentially linked with European incursion.  The defining of military 
milestones of political significance depends, furthermore, very much upon 
the context of world history on the one hand and the local political “flavour 
of the moment” on the other.  South Africa’s nineteenth-century English 
historians focused on settler history and defined historical milestones within 
that Eurocentric context.  On their heels followed the imperialistic school 
who stressed the progressive, “civilising” impact of the British Empire on 
the African continent.  Subsequently, a strong nationalist Afrikaner 
historiography developed which milestoned South African history in terms 
of the Afrikaner’s struggle against British domination and black peril in 
their quest for political independence in the interior.47  In settler and 
imperialist history, and more so in Afrikaner history which “provided the 
ideological substructure for the apartheid ideology and legitimised white 
domination”, Georgi Verbeeck contends 
there was no room for the … historical experience of the non-white … 
population group[s], not in the pre-colonial period nor thereafter … non-whites 
were not considered important enough to be accorded a history of their own … 
blacks disappear from the field of vision of an image of history dominated by 
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whites, unless when portrayed as enemies and opponents on one of the 
countless battlefields.48 
With the advent of the “New South Africa” Verbeeck observes: 
Inevitably, the abolition of apartheid also has far-reaching consequences for the 
historical culture of this country.  The enlarged image of history fits into a 
political strategy aiming to bring about a new national consensus.  The so-
called Rainbow Nation is looking for an image of history which can be linked 
to the new profile of a multicultural democracy.49 
Producing an inclusive, consensual image of South African history is 
an elusive, if not completely unachievable objective because it requires the 
accommodation, to some degree at least, of many different approaches and 
myths caught up in the different sectors of society’s sense of history and 
their understanding of the past.  What Tony Ullyatt says about writings on 
mythology, is also true of trying to distil a consensus history from South 
Africa’s divided past: 
… the problem of distorting presumptions, biased perspectives, ideological 
and/or academic stances seems inevitable. These stances introduce a wide 
variety of arguments designed primarily as self-justification.  While no one 
would want to deny the right of the writer to opt for what s/he considers 
appropriate theoretical contextualisation for her/his approach to the subject, the 
existence of such a diversity of approaches tends to muddy the waters rather 
than purify them.  While the best way to un-muddy the waters is to let them 
stand still, such a patient Buddhist approach seems beyond the capacity of most 
writers.50 
Socio-political impatience to hammer South African history into a 
mould that meets present demands leaves no room for somewhat “un-
muddying” South African history by allowing the passage of time to temper 
emotions and impose a more “objective” perspective.  “Public history”, 
Grundlingh holds, “often tends to range free, largely impervious to the 
arcane workings of the historical profession”.51 
South Africa’s long history of strife and violent conflict places 
military history centrally in the process of finding “an image of history 
which can be linked to the new profile of a multicultural democracy”.52  
Mills and Williams list Blood River, Isandlwana/Rorke’s Drift, Majuba, 
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Colenso, Delville Wood, El Alamein and Cuito Cuanovale as “7 Battles that 
shaped South Africa”.53  Many other battles and events in South Africa’s 
past could obviously be added to this list as military-political milestones.  
Kadar Asmal regards this selection as useful for three reasons.  Firstly, they 
”encapsulate South Africa’s political and ideological divisions and 
preoccupations over the past two centuries: Boer versus Zulu, Zulu versus 
Britain, Britain versus Boer, South Africa versus Germany, imperialist 
versus republican, the West versus the Soviet bloc and, critically, liberation 
against apartheid”.54  Secondly, these battles, as military-political 
milestones, bring home the important point that such events, set in a 
contested history such as South Africa’s, often signify completely different 
things to different people.  To quote Asmal again, for one side, Blood River 
might have been a symbolic victory, for the other it was not only known by 
a different name – Ncome River to the Zulu nation – but also signalled the 
beginning of a long period of hostility and oppression.55  Thirdly, it 
illustrates how the history is rewritten to give new meaning to the same 
milestones. 
An early example of an event illustrating the three points mentioned 
above is the Khoikhoi victory over the forces of the Portuguese Viceroy, 
Admiral Francisco de Almeida, in Table Bay in 1510, when they attacked a 
Khoikhoi settlement.56  From a Eurocentric perspective, this was a rather 
insignificant event that received comparatively little attention.  With the rise 
of African nationalism in the twentieth century, and the consequent 
reinterpretation and rewriting of South Africa’s history, the event however 
acquired significance as the earliest black resistance to European intrusion 
and oppression.57 
An important military-political milestone in South Africa’s colonial 
history was the Battle of Blaauwberg on 8 January 1806.  It established 
British rule in South Africa for over a century and led to much conflict and 
bloodshed during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Despite its 
impact on South African history, this milestone has by and large faded away 
into insignificance with the exodus of the British.  In the wake of British 
colonialism, Afrikaner nationalism dictated the identification and 
commemoration of milestones in South Africa’s military past in terms of the 
Afrikaner’s struggle to overcome black resistance to their penetration of the 
interior and their resistance to British political domination.  In the case of 
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the former, the Boer victories against the Ndebele at Vegkop in 1836 and 
the Zulu at Blood River on 16 December 1838 through perceived divine 
intervention and concentrated firepower, stand out.  Subsequently known as 
the Day of the Vow or the Day of the Covenant, or, colloquially, ‘Dingaan’s 
Day’, 16 December became a public holiday and Afrikaners celebrated it 
annually with great dedication.  The Boer victory at Congella (1842) and 
their defeat at Boomplaats (1848) became two early milestones in the 
Afrikaner’s armed resistance to British domination, followed by the two 
wars of independence in 1880–1881 and 1899–1902.  The Boer victory at 
Majuba on 27 February 1881 resonated throughout South Africa, and S.J. du 
Toit and others hailed it as the moment when Afrikaner nationalism really 
took root.58 
The Second Anglo-Boer War, milestoned as the Second War of 
Independence in Afrikaner history, in itself also represents several broader, 
international milestones.  “Based as it was on the [British] need to plunder 
gold from the Boer Republic”, Hussein Solomon observes, “it was the 20th 
century’s first resource war”.59  The Second Anglo-Boer War was also the 
first major anti-colonial war on the African continent and it indeed 
“tarnished the credibility of the British Empire as the world’s 
superpower”.60  On the other hand, the war, according to Ina Snyman et al. 
produced “an intolerant brand of Afrikaner nationalists whose more radical 
adherents came to power in 1948 … and the atrocities committed in the 
name of apartheid under their rule caused [particularly black] people to 
ignore the Anglo-Boer War”61 as a milestone in the anti-colonial struggle in 
Africa.  Eurocentrism and racial prejudice on the other hand caused both 
Boer and Briton to ignore the significant involvement of black people in the 
war for a century.62 
South Africa’s close ties with Great Britain after unification in 1910 
led to her participation on the side of the Allies under the banner of freedom 
and democracy during the two World Wars.  The South African government 
captured the Union’s contribution to these wars in official histories.  The 
Union commemorated inter alia the supreme sacrifice of her forces at 
Delville Wood during the First World War and their contribution to the 
allied victories in North Africa and Italy during the Second World War.  
When the National Party gained control in 1948, it pushed aside the Union’s 
contribution to the two World Wars as “Empire service” and focused on the 
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military milestones of Afrikaner history in their conflict with indigenous 
peoples and in their resistance to British domination.63 
According to the late Prof. Elize Botha, former Chancellor of 
Stellenbosch University, by the mid-1950s, some of the negative feelings 
regarding the Union’s participation in the two World Wars had already worn 
off amongst the general public.  She writes: 
Memories of the Second World War were still very strong …  Especially the 
young men of the 1950s remembered it well.  Whatever their politics or view 
of life was, as the opposition to South Africa’s participation in the war wore off 
they were in time able to identify with the “Springbucks” (as the soldiers of the 
South African divisions were called) who participated in the battles in North 
Africa … and subsequently invaded Italy with the British Eighth Army.64 
The National Party’s rise to power coincided with a major change in the 
context of world history, namely the beginning (or some might argue the 
intensification) of the Cold War, which influenced the identification and 
commemoration of South Africa’s military milestones significantly.  After 
unification in 1910, South Africa’s racial policies ignited an internal black 
liberation struggle that escalated dramatically under Nationalist rule and 
eventually threatened South Africa with complete international isolation.  
Hence the South African government went to great lengths to remind the 
Western world that South Africa was a valuable partner in international 
crises and that the country should not be pushed aside because of its internal 
policies.  The military-political milestones of the Afrikaner obviously 
remained important, but the Nationalist government now emphasised South 
Africa’s contribution to international milestones in the war against the 
‘forces of darkness’.  After its initial apathy towards South Africa’s 
contribution to the Allied war effort during the First and Second World 
Wars, the Nationalist government went to great pains by the 1970s to 
remind the world of the Union’s efforts and sacrifices in the interest of 
freedom and democracy during the World Wars.65  Battles such as Delville 
Wood and El Alamein together with the airlift of supplies to the Polish 
resistance, the so-called Warsaw Concerto, became important milestones in 
South Africa’s military history once more.  More importantly, the apartheid 
government exploited the prevailing Western view that the Soviet Union, in 
pursuance of its aim of world domination, was supporting and exploiting 
dissatisfaction, insurrection and liberation struggles across the globe to 
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expand its influence, gain footholds and strangle the Western powers.66  The 
apartheid regime portrayed both the internal black liberation struggle, 
spearheaded by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), and the hostility of the newly independent or 
self-governing African states towards South Africa as local manifestations 
of the global communist onslaught against the West.67  The RSA 
consequently depicted itself as the bulwark of Western democracy against 
the spread of communism in Southern Africa and emphasised its historic 
role in the Western effort to contain communism,68 highlighting its 
contributions to the Berlin Airlift (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950-
1953) and the Angolan Civil War (1975).69 
As the counter-revolutionary war escalated by the 1970s, the apartheid 
government began to emphasise the contribution of so-called coloured, 
Asian and black (African) South Africans during the two World Wars.  
Hence, the gallant action of the Cape Corps, a “coloured” regiment, at 
Square Hill in Palestine (September 1918) and the sacrifice of African lives 
with the sinking of the SS Mendi (21 February 1917) eventually took up 
their places as milestones in South African military history next to Delville 
Wood and other “white” battles and events.  This recognition was amongst 
other things motivated by the need to recruit black soldiers to relieve the 
Border War’s pressure on white manpower and the desire to motivate black 
people to join the war against “communist” insurgents.70  
Apartheid South Africa’s 23-year (1966–1989) Border War in 
northern Namibia and Angola lasted longer than America’s Vietnam War, 
and its history and milestones are in many ways as controversial and 
contested as those of the latter.  Commemorated as a highly successful 
airborne operation against a Swapo military base by the former South 
African Defence Force (SADF), the attack on Cassinga (4 May 1978) stands 
out to their opponents as the massacre of hundreds of Namibian refugees, 
mostly women and children.71  Both the former SADF and its Fapla/Plan 
(Swapo) opponents claimed the Battle of Cuito Cuanovale (1987–1988) as a 
victory.  The conflicting claims regarding Cassinga and Cuito Cuanovale 
have caused much reviewing and rewriting of the history of these two 
events.  The facts are still in dispute, but both remain highly politicised 
milestones in South African military history72 which still evoke divisive 
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sentiments in South African society because of the close historical links 
between the former liberation movements in Southern Africa. 
With the termination of the Border War and South Africa’s internal 
liberation struggle in 1989/90, and the subsequent establishment of an all-
inclusive defence force in 1994, the SANDF’s focus has shifted to peace 
missions on the African continent.  Naturally, South Africa’s next military 
milestone is to be found in that sphere.  In September 2009, the SANDF 
proudly celebrated ten years of involvement in peace missions on the 
African continent that started with the deployment of a capital liaison officer 
in Kampala in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in September 
1999.73  The SANDF and Botswana Defence Force (BDF) invasion of 
Lesotho a year earlier (Operation Boleas, September 1998), which arguably 
also fits into the realm of peace missions, is not even mentioned in the 
SANDF’s commemorative brochure.  This seems to be a result of it being a 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)-mandated operation 
instead of a United Nations (UN)-mandated mission.  However, the whole 
mandate controversy regarding Operation Boleas and the unfortunate 
blunders of that intervention perhaps also render it a less than 
commemorable milestone from a government and Department of Defence 
perspective. 
Yesterday’s Milestones Today 
Edward Said captures the complexities of commemorating milestones from 
a divisive past to a “united” present, such as South African’s fledgling 
democracy, when he observes: 
Appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of 
the present.  What animates such appeals is not only disagreement about what 
happened in the past and what the past was, but uncertainty about whether the 
past really is past, over and concluded, or whether it continues, albeit in 
different forms, perhaps.  This problem animates all sorts of discussions – 
about influence, about blame and judgement, about present actualities and 
future priorities.74 
Christopher Clapham stresses that liberation struggles change the self-
perception, identity and thought processes of those who participated in 
them.  The liberation struggle remains intensely alive in the memory of its 
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leaders long after they had taken over the government of the country and 
they carry with them an unshakable conviction of the justness of their cause 
and their responsibility to continue to pursue the objectives for which many 
have fought and died.75  It is their heart-felt duty to constantly rekindle the 
memories of their constituency to keep the spirit and vision of the liberation 
struggle alive.  South Africa has consequently, in the words of A.K. 
Hlongwane, been “in the grip of a ‘memory boom’…” since 1994.  These 
memories as “the ‘physical markers of past violence and repression’… [in 
the] ‘arena of societal struggles over memory’”76 led to the establishment of 
several new museums, amongst others the Robben Island Museum, the 
District Six Museum, the Apartheid Museum, the Hector Pieterson 
Memorial and Museum, the Sharpeville Exhibition Centre and Monument, 
and the Freedom Park project.  They also gave rise to popular annual 
commemorations of Human Rights Day (21 March, previously known as 
Heroes Day or Sharpeville Day), Freedom Day (27 April), Workers Day 
(1 May), National Youth Day (16 June, previously known as Soweto Day), 
Women’s Day (9 August), Heritage Day (24 September) and the Day of 
Reconciliation (16 December, formerly known as the Day of the Vow or 
Dingaan’s Day).77  Y. Seleti holds that national holidays, which 
“commemorate significant milestones in the struggle for freedom in South 
Africa, helps the nation to appreciate the importance of history, heritage and 
memory in the crafting of the present and future of this country”.78  In his 
view it “attempts to counteract amnesia as the basis for nation-building”.79 
The black “memory boom” explicitly endeavours to redress the 
domination of white, particularly Afrikaner, symbols of historical 
commemoration by drawing, in the words of former ANC Premier of 
Limpopo Province, Sello Moloto, “a connection between … colonial 
resisters (such as Kings Makhado, Sekhukhune and Nghunghunyane) and 
the liberation struggle in South Africa”.80  Moloto observes: 
The rest of the South African cultural and historical landscape is biased 
towards commemorating the “Anglo-Boer Wars” and therefore does not give 
deserved recognition to the role played by African chiefs in defence of their 
Chiefdoms.  [These kings] were brave individuals who were the pioneers of the 
liberation struggle.  Long before the ANC was born these kings fought the wars 
of resistance against colonialism and dispossession …  Makhado was never 
defeated nor subjugated by the Boers.  It is for these reasons that they should 
be commemorated.81 
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Several other names, including that of Chief Hintsa (Xhosa), 
mentioned earlier, and Kings Dingaan (Zulu), Moshweshwe (Sotho) and 
Malebogo (Hananwa/Batlokwa) may, of course, be added to Moloto’s list.82 
In February 2012, as head of state and commander-in-chief of the 
SANDF, President Jacob Zuma endeavoured to put the commemoration of 
the sinking of the SS Mendi in post-1994 perspective by instituting 
21 February, the day of its sinking, as Armed Forces Day.  Henceforth “the 
entire nation” is expected annually, on this date, “to pause and pay tribute to 
all members in uniform who have taken it upon themselves to serve the 
people of South Africa and defend the Constitution of the country, with their 
lives”.83  As a tale of heroic sacrifice in which history and myth meet to 
create “an extraordinary account … of war bravery”84 the sinking of the SS 
Mendi evokes compassion over a wide spectrum and is consequently a 
suitable milestone for public commemoration.  In the context of the 
liberation struggle, the Department of Defence and the SANDF, 
furthermore, commemorate the 1976 Soweto uprisings every year through 
the National Youth Day celebrations.  This emotional milestone can hardly 
be depoliticised, but the Department of Defence endeavours to 
commemorate it in a constructive way in the spirit of nation-building.  
Hence the Department’s 2012 theme for its Youth Day celebrations was 
“Entrenching our democracy by promoting youth cohesion through 
discipline and sports”.85 
In Hlongwane’s view, however, the commemoration of 16 June as 
National Youth Day has 
… like all other national days of commemoration … failed to bring South 
African youths and the population in general together across the colour line.  
Indeed, the commemoration of National Youth Day is seen as an affair for 
Africans.  The opposition parties whose constituency is largely within white 
communities have since 1994 been commemorating the 1976 uprisings, merely 
as part of the political agenda to attract African voters.86 
Though this is a sweeping statement, recent images of such 
commemorations on national television seemed to support this perspective 
of indifference on the part of other sectors of South African society.  
Furthermore, while liberation struggles often succeed in unifying subjugated 
people against oppressive regimes, underlying differences as often emerge 
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again once the liberation struggle has been won.87  Hence, Youth Day 
celebrations have also not managed to sustain unity amongst the various 
former liberation movements.88  The Socialist Party of Azania, for example, 
asserts that: 
Every year, since the whole of South Africa rose in protest against the failure 
of the first democratically elected government to recognise or even 
commemorate June 16 1976 when they took office in 1994, they have ever 
since then made it their business to make the loudest of noises about the day 
though with little commitment to it.  They have deliberately downgraded it, 
depoliticised it and christened it “Youth Day”, a day of mirth, drink and 
general fun where the government spends millions of rands entertaining the 
youth through song and dance.  The day, in line with politics of 
“reconciliation” has been made “user friendly” to allow the smooth 
participation of the perpetrators and the victims.  The sombre and reflective 
mood of commemorations has been stripped from the day.  They do not 
commemorate June 16, they do not remember and honour the sacrifices of 
those who gave their lives for our liberation instead they have chosen an 
innocuous way of doing it, they celebrate it.89 
Alongside these notions of pessimism some authors hold that the 
advent of the “New South Africa” in 1994 has indeed established some 
common ground and reciprocal accommodation in terms of military 
milestones between black and white.  Snyman et al., for instance, are of the 
opinion that the new political dispensation has made the Second Anglo-Boer 
War “okay”90 since Europeans now acknowledge the full involvement of 
black people in the war, while some black people now recognise it as the 
first major anti-colonial war in Africa and acknowledge the Boers as 
“freedom fighters”.91  Furthermore, the acceptance of the establishment date 
of the former SADF as the SANDF’s birthday may to some extent be 
construed as an act of accommodation, reconciliation and nation-building in 
itself on the part of government.  Recent ANC resistance to the equestrian 
statue of General Louis Botha, in the uniform of the former Union Defence 
Forces, at the entrance to Parliament has, however, demonstrated how 
divisive pre-1994 milestones still are.  Though Botha left a large footprint in 
South African military history, his presence in front of Parliament is due to 
the fact that he was the first premier of the Union of South Africa, not 
because of his military exploits.  On that basis, ANC Member of Parliament, 
Thandile Sunduza, stated in August 2012 that Botha’s statue belongs rather 
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in the Apartheid Museum and should be replaced by a statue of former 
President Nelson Mandela, “because he represents all of us”.92  The general 
response of parliamentarians from other political parties was that Mandela 
indeed deserves a place in front of the building, but that Botha should stay 
because he was also part of South Africa’s history and that part of the past 
cannot simply be wished away or erased.93  Similar sentiments are 
expressed regarding the current quest for the renaming of cities, towns and 
streets, etc., to allegedly “wipe out” South Africa’s pre-1994 history.94  And, 
every now and then, until recently, when a court ruling stopped him, former 
ANC Youth League leader, Julius Malema commemorated the liberation 
struggle by singing, in public, “Dubul’ ibhunu” (“shoot the Boers”), which 
threatened to rekindle old divisions.95  Similar emotions were stirred on 4 
November 2012 when President Jacob Zuma’s favourite and politically 
controversial struggle song “Awulethu Mshini Wami” (“bring me my 
machine gun”) “was blaring from a sound system”96 as ANC supporters 
stopped a march led by Democratic Alliance leader, Helen Zille, towards 
President Jacob Zuma’s homestead in Nkandla.  Zille’s march followed a 
public outcry over an alleged government expenditure of some R200 million 
to upgrade that residence.97  
On the other side of the hill, Dan Wylie bitingly observes, “certain 
die-hard Afrikaners continue to celebrate … the 1838 Battle of Blood 
River … even today”.98  During the bitter conflict over the renaming of the 
town of Louis Trichardt, commemorating a Voortrekker leader, to Makhado, 
commemorating a Venda king’s resistance to colonialism, the newly erected 
statue of King Makhado in that town was painted in the colours (orange, 
white and blue) of the old South African flag.  Though the culprits were 
never caught and some commentators claimed that this act of vandalism was 
committed by “hooligans and should not be viewed in terms of ‘white 
against black’ despite the obviously racial associations of the flag and colour 
symbolism”99 the suspicion of right-wing involvement lingered on.  The fact 
is that the wounds of the South African liberation struggle have not healed 
yet and reciprocal notions of mistrust and cultural-political entitlement or 
deprivation will probably prevail in South African society for decades to 
come.  Emotions still run high and memories of the liberation struggle will 
continue to be mobilised for political ends. 
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Conclusion 
South Africa’s divided past makes it impossible for the country in general 
and the SANDF in particular to consider the past hundred years only when 
they celebrate the latter’s centenary; it requires due recognition of the much 
longer separate and collective histories in which the perceptions and sense 
of identity of the various sectors of society are imbedded.  Milestones in the 
evolution of warfare are comparatively free from political and emotional 
baggage and could be recognised and commemorated by people with 
diverging socio-political backgrounds and convictions.  Milestones of 
bravery and heroic sacrifice might be more problematic because they often 
involve perpetrators and victims or winners and losers, and thus politics and 
emotions.  Common respect for human courage, suffering and sacrifice 
might nevertheless remove many obstacles in the defining and 
commemoration of such milestones, for example the sinking of the SS 
Mendi and the Battle of Delville Wood.  Commemorating military-political 
milestones such as Cassinga, Cuito Cuanovale and others, is quite different.  
The complexities in commemorating such contested, inherently divisive, 
military-political milestones make it practically impossible to find complete 
“feel-good”100 consensus across the socio-political spectrum.  Accolades 
from one perspective easily become albatrosses from another.  South 
Africans would therefore do well to acknowledge and respect the different 
perspectives regarding such milestones, and commemorate them for what 
they can learn from them about themselves and the nation to which they 
belong for the sake of building a better common future for all beyond the 
paralysing grip of their divided past. 
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